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Complex regulatory programs combine to 'protect" the environ-
ment by protracted and undependable administrative procedures
followed by years of litigation. Only the most hardy and well-
heeled can run so harsh a gauntlet. Burdened by land costs, loan
interest, and architectural, engineering, and attorney fees, many
entrepreneurs run out of money or heart or both long before the
finish line. 1
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I. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of complex regulatory programs presents a
formidable obstacle to constructing even the most environmen-
tally compatible, energy efficient, and socially desirable new or
expanded industrial facility in California, as elsewhere. In addi-
tion to California's restrictive land use policy,2 air quality require-
ments,3 and the lengthy environmental review often mandated by
the Environmental Quality Act,4 recently adopted federal pro-
2. California's Local Planning Act is set forth at CAT. GOV'T CODE §§ 65100-
65700, (West 1966 and Supp. 1966-1978). See also Digest of Regulatory Programs
and Nonregulatory Considerations for New or Expanded Industrial Facilities, in-
fra at 983 items 1-3 [hereinafter cited as Digest]; J. LONGTIN, CALIFORNIA LAND USE
REGULATIONS chs. 1, 2 (1977).
3. Cm.. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 39000-43835 (West 1979 & Supp. 1980). Di-
gest, supra note 2, item 4.
4. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21176 (West 1977); Digest, supra note 2, item
14.
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grams require new industrial facilities to use coal or some other
alternative to natural gas or petroleum, 5 and to incorporate into
their design the latest developments in control technology to
achieve federal standards for improving air 6 and water 7 quality.
Other regulatory programs require noise abatement,8 solid waste
management,9 and similar control actions. The cumulative effect
of this myriad of regulatory programs has been to lengthen
greatly the duration of the permit process for a new or expanded
industrial facility, and to create risks and uncertainties with re-
spect to the ultimate outcome until all required permits have
been obtained and substantial construction has commenced.
Although the risks and uncertainties inherent in the permit pro-
cess cannot be eliminated, industrial development can still be ac-
complished in California.0 It is essential, however, that a
comprehensive and realistic approach to the permit process be
developed at the conception of the project so that the facility can
be located, designed, and engineered, to the greatest extent possi-
ble, to accommodate the regulatory requirements. Development
of a successful program necessitates an interdisciplinary ap-
proach, involving close coordination among management, engi-
neers, and attorneys.
This article is intended to guide the attorney advising a client
who proposes to construct or expand an industrial facility in Cali-
fornia. First, the article provides a digest of potentially applicable
local, state, and federal regulatory programs and certain other
non-regulatory considerations. Second, the article discusses in
5. Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8483
(Supp. 1I 1979); Digest, supra note 2, item 6.
6. Clean Air Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. 1I 1979); Di-
gest, supra note 2, item 4.
7. Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. I1 1979); Digest,
supra note 2, item 5.
8. Noise Pollution and Abatement Law of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-4918 (1976 &
Supp. II 1979); California Noise Control Act of 1973, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 46000-46080 (West 1979); Digest, supra note 2, item 10.
9. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987
(1976 & Supp. M 1979); Z'berg-Kapiloff Solid Waste Control Act of 1976, CAT_ GOV'T
CODE §§ 66795-66796.83 (West Supp. 1966-1978); Digest, supra note 2, item 9.
10. California is currently in violation of Clean Air Act §§ 110, 176, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7502, 7507 (Supp. I 1979), in that it has not submitted acceptable SIP revisions
providing for, among other things, motor vehicle inspections. See text accompany-
ing notes 60-67 infra. Therefore, since July 1, 1979, no major new source permits
may be issued in California. The discussion in this article assumes that this situa-
tion will be remedied.
more detail the air and water quality requirements and the other
regulatory schemes which impose the most serious constraints on
industrial development in California. Third, the article considers
the risks and uncertainties which will be encountered as a result
of various aspects of the regulatory process and the relative inef-
fectiveness of judicial review. Finally, the article concludes by of-
fering suggestions for formulating a strategy for successfully
obtaining the required permits and approvals.
II. DIGEST OF GENERALLY APPLICABLE REGULATORY PROGRAMS
An important first step in advising a client who is proposing to
construct or expand an industrial facility is to prepare a compen-
dium of all local, state, and federal regulatory programs that con-
ceivably could be applied to the project. Unlike commercial or
residential developments, which are primarily restricted by zon-
ing and other land use regulations, an industrial facility must, in
addition, comply with the many regulatory programs imposing en-
vironmental and energy related requirements.
The following digest identifies the principal land use, environ-
mental, and energy related regulatory programs that are generally
applicable, and is intended to provide a quick and ready reference
to assist the attorney in determining which statutes and regula-
tions apply to a particular new or expanded industrial facility.
The regulatory programs enumerated are by no means exhaus-
tive, and the attorney should consult the statutes and regulations
themselves in connection with each proposed project and should
not overlook other programs which may impact the particular
project. The digest also identifies non-regulatory requirements,
such as the availability of local services, which must be consid-
ered by the attorney in advising a client proposing to construct or
expand an industrial facility.
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IT. PLANT DESIGN, SITING, AND CONSTRUCTION CONSIDERATIONS
Each of the regulatory programs in the digest may impact the
siting, design, or construction of a new or expanded industrial fa-
cility. The following discussion considers in more detail the major
regulatory programs which are likely to impose the most serious
constraints to industrial development in California.
A. Air Quality Regulation
Air quality regulation in the United States is provided by an in-
terlocking federal-state system prescribed by the Clean Air Act,
as amended, 45 and by various state air quality laws and regula-
tions. The Clean Air Act requires the EPA to divide the country
into air quality control regions4 6 and to establish, among other
standards, national primary and secondary ambient air quality
standards ("NAAQS") for prevalent pollutants endangering pub-
lic health.47 To date, standards have been established for nitro-
gen dioxide, sulfur dioxide, hydrocarbons, photochemical oxidant,
particulate matter, and carbon monoxide ("criteria pollutants"). 48
All states are required to adopt and receive EPA approval of a
plant implementing the Clean Air Act (state implementation
plans, referred to as "SIP's") that will achieve compliance with
the primary NAAQS within three years and with the secondary
NAAQS within a reasonable time.4 9
The Clean Air Act requires that each SIP establish preconstruc-
tion review procedures which will insure (i) that no major new or
modified source will be approved if such source will prevent expe-
ditious attainment of the NAAQS in those areas where such stan-
dards have not been achieved (non-attainment areas, which are
subject to new source review),50 and (ii) prevention of significant
deterioration of the air quality in those areas currently in compli-
ance with the NAAQS ("PSD" areas, which are subject to PSD
45. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. 111 1979).
46. Id. § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 7407.
47. Id. § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409.
48. 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.2-.11 (1980). A proposed preliminary standard for lead was
published in 42 Fed. Reg. 63076 (1977). Clean Air Act § 112(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7412
(Supp. 1I 1979) requires the EPA to establish standards for hazardous air pollu-
tants as defined therein and to date standards have been established for asbestos,
mercury, beryllium, and vinyl chloride. 40 C.F.R. § 61.01-.71 (1980).
49. Clean Air Act § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (Supp. IM 1979).
50. Id. § 172, 42 U.S.C. § 7502.
review) .51
1. Air Quality Permits in California
To obtain the required permits for a new or expanded industrial
facility, a company must comply with (i) the federal and state
new source review regulations for non-attainment areas, (ii) the
federal PSD regulations for attainment areas, and (iii) the federal
and state equipment performance standards. As discussed below,
the new source review and PSD rules provide facility-wide emis-
sion limitations which can be satisfied by reducing the air con-
taminant emissions at some other facility. Such reductions are
commonly referred to as "emission offsets." In contrast, the
equipment performance standards impose emission limitations
on individual units of equipment. Such limitations may not be ex-
ceeded or the unit will not be allowed to operate.5 2 These per-
formance standards are prohibitory and cannot be avoided by
acquiring emission offsets.
In California, the Air Resources Board ("ARB") has statewide
authority to control mobile sources, and has significant oversight
authority for stationary sources. 5 3 The regional air quality man-
agement districts and local air pollution control districts (collec-
tively, "AQMD's") have the primary authority to control
stationary sources. 4 The AQMD's adopt their own regulations
and enforcement procedures which may be more restrictive than
the standards established by the ARB,55 which in turn may be
more restrictive than the federal standards.56 With ARB ap-
proval, these regulations become part of the California SIP.57
Permit applications for new or expanded facilities must be
made to the AQMD's. For example, in the South Coast Air Basin,
applications must be made to the South Coast Air Quality Man-
agement District (the "SCAQMD"). The SCAQMD, like most
other air pollution control agencies, has a two-stage permit pro-
cess. Apermit to construct will be issued if it reasonably appears
from the application and supporting performance data that the fa-
cility will comply with the new source review and equipment per-
51. Id. § 159, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7491 (1980).
52. Id. § 111(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b). For an example of California New Source
Performance Standards, see SCAQMD Regulations series IV and IX.
53. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 39003, 39602 (West 1979). The California air
resources statute is set forth at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 39000-43835 (West
1979).
54. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 41500-41603 (West 1979).
55. Id. § 39002.
56. Union Elec. Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 427 U.S. 246 (1976).
57. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 41500, 41503 (West 1979).
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formance standards.5 8 After construction, a permit to operate will
be issued only if the source, when tested, in fact complies with
such regulations and standards. 59
2. New Source Review
The 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act require that as of
July 1, 1979, all SIP's be revised to provide additional control in
non-attainment areas. 60 Different and more stringent require-
ments are imposed in states that are unable to demonstrate in
their SIP's that compliance with NAAQS will be achieved by De-
cember 31, 1982, and in areas that require extensions for compli-
ance to December 31, 1987.61 Generally, new source review
permits will not be issued unless (i) the applicant demonstrates
that all new and existing air contaminant-emitting equipment at
the major new source will achieve the lowest achievable emission
rate ("LAER"), and (ii) the permit agency finds that by the time
the new facility is in operation there will be overall reductions in
pollution levels in the area sufficient to constitute reasonable pro-
gress toward attaining the NAAQS.62 With respect to areas re-
quiring extensions to December 31, 1987 for attaining compliance
with NAAQS, the SIP's must additionally require, prior to the is-
suance of any permit for construction and modification of a major
emitting facility, that an analysis be made of alternate sites, pro-
duction processes, environmental controls, and similar matters;
and that it be demonstrated that the benefits of the new or modi-
fied source significantly outweigh the environmental and social
costs imposed by it.63 These additional requirements appear sim-
ilar to an environmental impact statement and will make it more
difficult to locate a major facility in a non-attainment area unable
to demonstrate attainment with NAAQS by December 31, 1982.
To date, California has failed to submit satisfactory SIP revi-
sions, and is in violation of the federal requirements. The sanc-
tions imposed on a state for failure to have an approved new
source review element in its SIP include a possible curtailment of
58. SCAQMD Rule 201 and "List and Criteria Identifying Information Re-
quired of Applicants Seeking a Permit to Construct from the South Coast Air
Quality Management District" available from the SCAQMD.
59. SCAQMD Rule 203.
60. Clean Air Act § 172, 42 U.S.C. § 7502 (Supp. I1 1979).
61. Id. § 172(a) (2)-(b) (11), 42 U.S.C. § 7502.
62. Id. § 173, 42 U.S.C. § 7503.
63. Id. § 172(b) (11) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b) (11).
grant funds, and, more importantly, a prohibition on the construc-
tion of new major facilities.64 Additionally, for non-attainment ar-
eas in California, the prohibition of new construction will
continue until an appropriate vehicle inspection plan and trans-
portation element are approved.65 Applications filed in California
on or before June 30, 1979, under the new source rules may be re-
viewed, permits issued, and the facilities constructed. Applica-
tions filed after June 30, 1979 may be processed, but any permits
issued must be made subject to SIP approval. No construction
can be commenced until such approval is obtained.66
Prior to July 1, 1979, a new stationary source was subject to re-
view by both the EPA and the appropriate state agency, unless
the state's review procedures had been approved by the EPA.
However, the states are now given sole responsibility for new
source review, and the duplicative review by the EPA has been
eliminated.67
3. PSD Review
Under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, the SIP's must
provide for the prevention of significant deterioration of air quali-
ty in attainment areas, that is, areas currently having better air
quality than the primary NAAQS.68 The Clean Air Act divides the
attainment areas of the country into Classes I, H, or III and estab-
lishes the permissible emission increases, or increments, for each
class. 69
Neither California nor any other state has to date received EPA
approval of a PSD review element. Accordingly, all PSD review is
currently conducted by the EPA.70
A company seeking to construct or expand an industrial facility
in a PSD area must demonstrate either that there will be no net
increase in the emissions in the area or, by appropriate air quality
modeling data, demonstrate that the emissions from the new or
64. Id. §§ 113(a) (5), 176, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413(a) (5), 7506; 40 C.F.R. § 52.24 (1980).
65. Clean Air Act § 172(b) (11) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b) (11) (B) (Supp. MI 1979).
66. Telephone conversation between Bruce Beckman and James Hanson of
the Region IX office of the EPA.
67. Formerly, until the new source review element of a state's SIP had been
approved by the EPA, it was necessary to submit applications to the EPA for new
source review permits. As of July 1, 1979, the EPA no longer does new source re-
view.
68. Clean Air Act § 159, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7491 (Supp. I1 1979). The PSD pro-
gram is included in the EPA's consolidated permit regulations. 40 C.FjR. §§ 122.1-
.66, 123.1-.137, 124.1-.128, 125.1-.104 (1980).
69. Clean Air Act §§ 162-164, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7472-7474 (Supp. MI 1979).
70. Telephone conversation between Bruce Beckman and James Hanson of
the Region IX office of the EPA.
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expanded facility will not (i) exceed the allowable increment for a
contaminant for which baseline and allowable increment has
been established, and (ii) cause a violation of an NAAQS.71 If ei-
ther of the above will occur, the facility cannot be constructed
unless sufficient emission offsets are acquired.7 2 In addition, all
new and expanded facilities that will emit a net increase of any of
the criteria pollutants, are required to employ best available con-
trol technology ("BACT") on all air contaminant-emitting equip-
ment.7 3 The EPA is currently allowing the available PSD
increments to be used up on a first-come-first-served basis.7 4
A number of companies challenged the EPA's PSD regulations
in Alabama Power Company v. Costle.75 Initially, a preliminary
decision was issued by the court giving partial relief to the plain-
tiffs and remanding a number of the EPA's PSD review regula-
tions for revision. Prior to rendition of the final decision, PSD
review was conducted under the then existing rules. The EPA's
Region IX office, with jurisdiction for California, included a state-
ment in its PSD permits stating that the permit might be affected
by a future court decision. The final decision merely gave ex-
panded reasons for the positions taken by the court in the prelim-
inary decision, except with respect to the application of PSD rules
in non-attainment areas whose pollution would affect attainment
areas.
4. Emission Offsets
As discussed above, emission offsets are emission reductions
usually achieved by the installation of control devices at some
other nearby facility. Such reductions are then credited to the ap-
plicant's proposed facility so that it can attain the emission levels
mandated by applicable new source review or PSD regulations.
Emission offsets may seem to offer a ready solution to a company
71. Clean Air Act § 165(a) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a) (3) (Supp. I1 1979). The
Clean Air Act establishes increments only for particulate matter and sulfur diox-
ide. Section 166(a)-(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7476(a)-(b) (Supp. I 1979), requires the EPA
to promulgate regulations to prevent significant deterioration of air quality by
other criteria pollutants no later than August 7, 1979, to become effective one year
after the date of promulgation.
72. See the EPA's Emission Offset Interpretative Ruling of January 16, 1979.
40 C.F.R. § 51 app. S (1979).
73. Clean Air Act § 165(a) (4), 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a) (4) (Supp. 1I 1979) (stayed in
part until further notice, May 13, 1980).
74. 43 Fed. Reg. 26,400 (1978).
75. Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 606 F.2d 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
that finds its plans for industrial development constrained by air
quality regulations. However, offsets are not easily found and are
often very expensive.
Emission offsets may be difficult to locate even in highly indus-
trialized areas. Many industrial facilities are not useful offset can-
didates because the major portion of their emissions cannot be
cleaned up by the application of available control technology. In
addition, if potential emission reductions have been mandated by
a proposed federal or state regulation, such reductions cannot be
utilized as emission offsets.76 The availability of emission offset is
further diminished by the prevalent attitude among companies
that potential reduction capability should be saved for future in-
dustrial expansion and not be sold to other industries.
The costs of offsets can be substantial. They include the cost of
(i) identifying the candidates, (ii) determining the current actual
emissions of the candidates, (iii) determining whether control
technology is available to achieve the necessary reductions, (iv)
negotiating for permission to use the offsets, and (v) engineering
and installing the control equipment. The cost of offsets for hy-
drocarbon emissions in the South Coast Air Basin was recently
estimated to be in the area of $1000 per pound.77
Careful consideration should be given to the tax consequences
of offset arrangements, including who is to have the benefit of the
expense deductions, what useful life must be established for the
equipment, and the availability of investment tax credits.
5. The Permit Process
The siting, design, and construction of most industrial facilities
will be constrained most seriously by federal and state air quality
requirements. Accordingly, it is essential that the company's
team conduct a thorough analysis of the project's emissions and
air pollution control requirements at the inception of the project.
In conducting such analysis, the following should be determined:
(i) The amount of "uncontrolled" emissions of the criteria pol-
lutants from the proposed facility (or the increase in such emis-
sions if an existing facility is being expanded). Because air
quality regulations may preclude construction of the facility with
the desired production capacity, it should also be determined
76. 40 C.F.R. § 51.18 (1980).
77. This figure was based on the authors' recent experience in supervising ne-
gotiations for the purchase of organic gas emission offsets for a new proposed fa-
cility in the South Coast Air Basin. Mr. Beckman found the price to be
comparable in the San Francisco Bay area in negotiation for the sale of such emis-
sions.
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whether the projected emissions would be significantly affected
by a marginal reduction in the design capacity of the facility.
(ii) Which emission control equipment is commerically avail-
able and demonstrated for the particular application, the cost of
such equipment, the availability of performance guarantees from
each manufacturer, and the amount of emission reductions which
will be achieved by installation of each control device.
(iii) All potential sites for the proposed facility and, for each
such site, the air quality region designated by the EPA and the
air quality management district or air pollution control district
designated under California law.
(iv) Whether, for each site, the area is an attainment or non-
attainment area and for which of the criteria pollutants. For pol-
lutants for which the area is non-attainment, the proposed facility
will be reviewed under the new source review regulations promul-
gated by the applicable AQMD and made part of the state SIP.
For pollutants for which the area is attainment, the proposed fa-
cility will be reviewed under the PSD regulations administered by
the EPA.
(v) The allowable increment for each pollutant and whether,
for criteria pollutants subject to PSD review, the facility is located
in an area designated Class I, H, or Ill. The current situation is
unsettled regarding whether state implementation plans will al-
low a permit to issue if the proposed facility's emissions will im-
pact a Class I area in any significant way. Accordingly, it still
appears to be a reasonable rule of thumb to have a twenty-five
mile or greater buffer from any Class I area depending on meteor-
ological conditions at the site. Also, determine whether the EPA
will require air quality modeling and monitoring to determine the
actual impact of the emissions. Next, for all air contaminant
emitting equipment, determine which commercially available and
demonstrated control equipment will be required to satisfy the
requirement for "best available control technology." Finally, if af-
ter installation of such control equipment, the proposed facility
will exceed the allowable increment, or if the increment has been
exhausted, determine the amount of emission offsets which will
be required.
(vi) Which commercially available control equipment will be
mandated to achieve the required "lowest achievable emission
rate" for criteria pollutants subject to new source review. Next,
determine whether emissions from the facility (or increase in
emissions from an expanded facility) will exceed the emissions
allowed under the applicable new source review regulations after
installation of the required control equipment. If so, determine
the amount of the emission offsets which will be required.
(vii) If emission offsets will be required under either PSD or
new source review, identify nearby facilities that would be pro-
spective offset candidates and determine whether control technol-
ogy is available to achieve the necessary reductions.
(viii) The equipment performance standards promulgated by
the applicable AQMD and the new source performance standards
promulgated by the EPA that might affect any of the air contami-
nant-emitting equipment proposed for installation at the facility
and the cost of complying with such standards.
(ix) Whether, for each of the proposed sites, the proposed fa-
cility could be constructed in conformance with applicable EPA
and California regulations, and if so, the cost of required control
equipment and emission offsets. The company can then select
among the feasible sites based on marketing, transportation and
other relevant factors.
B. Water Quality Regulation
Water quality control is provided by the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act of 1972, as substantially amended by the Clean
Water Act of 1977 ("FWPCA").78 Among other requirements,
FWPCA establishes (i) water quality and thermal pollution stan-
dards,7 9 (ii) effluent limitations,80 (iii) pretreatment standards for
effluents prior to discharge into public treatment systems,8 1 (iv)
ocean discharge standards,8 2 and (v) a permit system under the
EPA-administered National Pollution Discharge Elimination Sys-
tem ("NPDES").83 The FWPCA applies to any discharges to nav-
igable surface waters that may carry pollutants.
78. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The FWPCA program is in-
cluded in the EPA's consolidated permit regulations. 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.1-125.104
(1980).
79. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313, 1326 (1976 & Supp. M 1979); 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.1-.66 (1979).
80. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1976). Facilities discharging directly into navigable waters
must comply with the stricter of either the effluent standards or the ambient water
quality standards. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1) (C) (1976).
81. Id. § 1317(b) (1976 & Supp. I 1979); 40 C.F.R. §§ 403.1-.14 (1980).
82. 33 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976); 40 C.F.R. §§ 220.1-229.3 (1980).
83. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976 & Supp. II 1979). See also Shell Oil Co. v. Train, 585
F.2d 408, 410 (9th Cir. 1978). Facilities discharging into a publicly owned treatment
works are not required to obtain an NPDES permit. The municipality must obtain
such permit for the discharge from the treatment works. The facility discharging
to the treatment works must comply with the pretreatment regulations, if applica-
ble.
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The FWPCA also prescribes various time limits for the installa-
tion of control technology on discharges from point sources 84 and
requires new sources to achieve effluent limitations based upon
the best available demonstrated technology.85
1. Water Quality Control in California
The California water quality control system was established by
the Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act.86 This legislation
is very similar in concept to the FWPCA. Control is established
by regional water quality control plans adopted by regional water
control boards.8 7
California is authorized to issue permits under the FWPCA.88
A company proposing to construct or expand an industrial facility
in California that will discharge effluent directly to navigable
water must apply to the appropriate regional water quality con-
trol board which will issue the NPDES permit. This permit will
qualify the discharges under both federal and state law. Under
EPA regulations, the regional board first issues a tentative permit
which is sent to the EPA, which has thirty days to review it.89
The regional board then holds a public hearing and, if no objec-
tion is interposed by the EPA, adopts the permit. A copy is again
sent to the EPA which has an additional ten day review period. If
the EPA does not object, the final permit is issued.90
As discussed above, the NPDES permit only covers direct dis-
charges to navigable surface water. Any discharges to ground,
such as the hauling of noxious liquid wastes to landfills or the dis-
position of liquid wastes in dry wells, are regulated solely by the
state.91 Permits must be obtained in each of these instances. In
most instances, the regional boards require all industrial wastes,
other than those small amounts that must be disposed of in Class
84. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1976 & Supp. 11 1979).
85. 33 U.S.C. § 1316 (1976).
86. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13000-13998 (West 1971 & Supp. 1980).
87. CAL. WATER CODE § 13240 (West 1971).
88. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976 & Supp. I1 1979); CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13370-13389
(West Supp. 1980); 40 C.F.R. § 124.1(e) (1980).
89. 40 C.F.R. § 124.3(c) (1980).
90. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)-1342(f) (1976 & Supp. I 1979). See Crown Simpson
Pulp Co. v. Costle, 599 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1979) for a discussion of the interaction of
the federal and California water quality control programs.
91. Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310 (5th Cir. 1977). See 58 Op. CAL. ATr'y
GEN. 531 (1975). Discharges to non-navigable waters in California are regulated
under CAL WATER CODE §§ 13260-13270 (West 1971 & Supp. 1980).
1 hazardous material landfill sites, to be discharged into a treat-
ment system.92
2. Practical Considerations
A company proposing to construct or expand an industrial facil-
ity can either plan to do a complete treatment of its effluent on
site or arrange by contract to discharge its untreated or partially
treated effluent to a municipal treatment system. If complete
treatment is chosen, the municipal system can be totally by-
passed only if there is some waterway into which the effluent
from the facility can be directly discharged. In some areas, it will
be necessary to discharge even completely treated effluent into
the municipal system, because no access will exist to any other
point of disposal.
If the company chooses to do a complete treatment of the facil-
ity's effluent, it must meet all NPDES requirements. These re-
quirements, which can change from time to time, will regulate,
among other things, the quality, temperature, PH, and biological
oxygen demand ("BOD") and the total suspended solids, heavy
metals, hydrocarbons, and pesticides content of the effluent.9 3
If the company chooses to discharge its effluent into a munici-
pal system, certain other problems will likely be encountered.
The municipality must be able and willing to accept and treat the
effluent. Some pretreatment may be required under the FWPCA
because some contaminants in the effluent would otherwise pass
through or interfere with the municipal system. The municipality
will be subject to NPDES permit requirements. The municipal
treatment plants, particularly those operated by smaller cities,
may not be operated by qualified personnel.94 As a result, it is
not uncommon for the treatment facilities to malfunction-result-
ing in violations of the permit requirements. In such cases, if the
state board or the municipality does not take sufficient action, the
EPA can intervene and require the company to pretreat its efflu-
92. Discussions by the authors with the staff at the California Regional Water
Quality Control Board, Los Angeles office.
93. 40 C.F.R. §§ 401.11-.16 (1980).
94. J. Brian Molloy, Director, Water Enforcement Division, EPA, reported on
July 9, 1979, *at a symposium on waste-water treatment in Neosko, Missouri, that
(i) the EPA would bring court actions against cities and private industries violat-
ing pretreatment regulations, (ii) only about 6,000 out of 17,000 publicly owned
treatment works were in compliance with the July 1, 1977, secondary treatment
deadline, (iii) only 1,200 of 3,000 major facilities are in compliance, and the EPA
knows of 175 of that 1,200 which are not complying with their permit for operations
and maintenance reasons, and (iv) future cases could see appointment of special
masters to run a facility, or a court order requiring the facility to tie in to a re-
gional facility. 10 ElNVT'L REP. 649 (1979). Discussions of the authors with knowl-
edgeable industrial wastewater personnel support the same proposition.
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ent or forbid the municipality from accepting the effluent for
treatment on the ground that its system is unable to treat the
quantity involved. Therefore, even if the company has a contract
with the municipal system, it may find itself unable to discharge
into that system, and find its legal remedies, if any, against the
municipality for breach of contract to be inadequate.
Pretreatment poses certain other problems. The facilities
needed to accomplish the necessary pretreatment require a sub-
stantial investment of space and capital. The overall costs may be
increased because the municipality will likely assess the com-
pany for discharging the pretreated effluent into the municipal
system. Particularly in smaller communities, the municipality
will have a considerable capital investment in its treatment sys-
tem, creating substantial costs which will remain relatively con-
stant regardless of whether the company's effluent is or is not
pretreated. Therefore, even if the sewer discharge fees are based
on the BOD and suspended solid content of the effluent, the mu-
nicipality will simply be forced to increase the charges to main-
tain its revenue at the level required to cover these fixed costs.
If the project involves an expansion, the company may find that
the municipal system into which it has been discharging will be
unable to expand to accept the increased discharges. The com-
pany will then be faced with the choice of either helping to
finance the expansion of the municipal system or installing pre-
treatment capacity for the expansion. In the latter case, it may be
more economical to establish pretreatment capacity for the entire
discharge of the facility and discharge the effluent directly to a
waterway (if this is possible). The decision of whether or not to
withdraw from the municipal treatment system, of which the
company may be the principal user, can involve serious political
considerations.
If possible, direct discharges to an ocean should be avoided.
The EPA's ocean protection policy requires very expensive mod-
eling, dilution studies, and environmental assessments, which are
not applicable to discharges to streams or municipal systems.95
The decision of whether a company should treat its own efflu-
95. 33 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976 & Supp. 1 1979); 40 C.F.R. §§ 220-227 (1980) (regula-
tions under the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, as
amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1444 (1976 & Supp. 11 1979)). EPA Interim Permitting
Guidelines, 44 Fed. Reg 65751 (1979); Proposed Ocean Discharge Criteria, 45 Fed.
Reg. 9548-55 (1980).
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ent or use a municipal system is complex and requires careful
evaluation of all of the above considerations. It will be necessary
for the attorney advising a client with respect to a proposed new
or expanded facility to (i) identify the pollutants that the new or
expanded facility will discharge to surface water or to ground, (ii)
identify the water quality standards that apply to such pollutants,
(iii) work with company personnel or consultants to identify the
control technology and the permits that would be required for
pretreatment, and the delays, if any, in obtaining and installing
such control technology, and (iv) work with company personnel
or consultants to determine if the municipal system is reliable
and has the capacity to accept the untreated effluent, or if unrelia-
ble or inadequate, determine the cost to the company of upgrad-
ing the municipal system. As with air quality permit
considerations, this information must be integrated into the de-
sign process at the earliest possible stage.
C. National and California Environmental Quality Acts
The National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA")96 requires
preparation, circulation and approval of an environmental impact
statement ("EIS") whenever a major federal action affecting the
human environment is being taken.9 7 This may include issuing
permits or licenses, approving projects or grants, and other dis-
cretionary decisions.
Many states have adopted similar environmental review proce-
dures commonly referred to as "little NEPA's." In California, the
Environmental Quality Act 98 requires preparation of an environ-
mental impact report (EIR) whenever a discretionary, as opposed
to a ministerial, permit is to be issued on a private project and
whenever a state project that would have significant environmen-
tal consequences is being undertaken. 99
The EIR or EIS process is time-consuming and exposes the cli-
ent to a whole new area of uncertainty and risk. For example, it
is not uncommon for an agency, such as the ARB, to make few or
no comments on a draft EIR when it is initially circulated, but
subsequently to object to the issuance of a permit by the local
AQMD based on grounds that could and should have been raised
at the draft EIR stage. This objection can occur after significant
time has elapsed and substantial additional engineering expense
96. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4369 (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979).
97. Id. § 4332(c).
98. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21175 (West 1977 & Supp. 1980).
99. Id. §§ 21080(b) (1), 21100, 21151; Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervi-
sors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1972).
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has been incurred. To avoid this uncertainty, the EIR process
should be avoided, if at all possible, by designing the project ei-
ther to avoid discretionary permits or to qualify for a negative
declaration.
A comprehensive discussion of the types of agency permits and
approvals that will trigger the requirement for an EIS or EIR is
beyond the scope of this article. However, in general, unless a
zone change, variance, or conditional use permit is required, it is
quite possible that no EIR or EIS will be necessary for new or ex-
panded industrial facilities because all permits ordinarily re-
quired will be ministerial in nature, rather than discretionary, and
no major federal actions will be involved.100
There are at least two areas involving the application of NEPA
and CEQA that are unresolved and to which attorneys should be
alerted. The first is the potential problem raised by obtaining var-
iances in an area otherwise considered ministerial. For.example,
issuance of a building permit is generally considered ministe-
rial.101 That is, if the required showing of compliance with local
code requirements is made, the permit must issue. Variances
from code requirements, however, can be considered discretion-
ary.102 If enough variances are sought so as to be considered of
significant impact, it can be, and has been, argued that an EIR
should be required. Accordingly, the attorney should consider the
potential cumulative impact of needed variances before the peti-
tions are filed.
The second problem area is the possibility that the granting of a
permit, under new source or PSD review where the air pollution
emission level is such that an air quality impact analysis is re-
quired, may be considered to be a major discretionary action re-
quiring preparation of an EIS or EIR.103 It has not been finally
resolved whether the preparation of an air quality impact analysis
(and the issuance of a permit based thereon) by an AQMD is a
discretionary action requiring preparation of an EIR. This possi-
bility should be given serious attention and the requirement
100. "Major federal actions" is defined in 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4 (1979).
101. 14 CAL. ADmIN. CODE § 15073(b)(1) (West 1980).
102. Whether or not to grant a variance is generally within the discretion of the
agency. Most variances from building code requirements are not of a nature to be
of significant impact, even if a large number of these are accumulated. This can,
however, be an area of vulnerability to litigation delay for controversial projects.
Variances from other regulations could be quite significant. -
103. 40 C.F.R. § 51.18 (1980); Interpretative Rulings, 41 Fed. Reg. 55528-30 (1976).
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avoided if at all possible by design change, acquisition of emission
offsets, or otherwise.
Depending on the size of the proposed facility, building permits,
variances, and even air quality permits are sometimes obtained
by the project engineers without the assistance of legal counsel.
However, the attorney should be kept advised of these activities,
so that the inadvertent triggering of an EIR or EIS, with its poten-
tial for delay and expense, can be avoided.
D. Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978
The Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 ("FUA")104
was signed into law in November of 1978 and became effective on
March 8, 1979.105 FUA prohibits new major fuel-burning installa-
tions ("MFBI's") from using petroleum or natural gas as a pri-
mary energy source unless an exemption is granted by the
Economic Regulatory Administration of the Department of En-
ergy ("ERA").106 MFBI's are primarily industrial or utility boilers
that have a design capacity exceeding 100 million Btu heat input
(or several units at a single facility that in the aggregate exceed
250 million Btu heat input). "New" MFBI's are units with respect
to which construction or acquisition began (i) after November 9,
1978, (the date of enactment of FUA) or (ii) after April 20, 1977,
(when the first bill, which ultimately was transformed into FUA,
was introduced) unless the petitioner can demonstrate that the
installation cannot be cancelled or modified to comply with FUA
without a substantial financial penalty. 0 7
Temporary and permanent exemptions are available if the ap-
plicant can make the factual showing required by FUA and the
implementing regulations.10 8 In general, exemptions are available
if coal or another alternate fuel cannot be used because (i) the
cost would substantially exceed the cost of using imported petro-
leum,1 0 9 (ii) an adequate and reliable supply is not and will not
be available,110 (iii) physical limitations of site preclude installa-
tion of the required equipment,"' or (iv) applicable environmen-
tal regulations would be violated.112
104. Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8483
(Supp. 1I 1979).
105. Pub. L. No. 95-620, § 901, 92 Stat. 3349 (1978).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 8312 (Supp. 1I 1979).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 8302(a) (10)-(1l) (Supp. 111 1979).
108. 42 U.S.C. §§ 8321-8322 (Supp. I 1979); 10 C.F.R. pt. 503 (1980).
109. 42 U.S.C. §§ 8321(a) (1), 8322(a) (1)(A) (ii) (Supp. M1 1979).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 8322(a) (1) (A) (i) (Supp. I 1979).
111. 42 U.S.C. §§ 8321(a) (2), 8322(a) (1) (B) (Supp. 1I 1979).
112. 42 U.S.C. §§ 8321(a) (3), 8322(a) (1) (C) (Supp. I 1979). FUA also provides
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FUA and the implementing regulations present a number of se-
rious practical and legal problems. 113 For example, the ERA may
deny a petition for a permanent exemption and grant instead a
temporary exemption (authorizing a new MFBI to use petroleum
or natural gas for a period of up to five years) on the grounds that
the company failed to demonstrate, as required by FUA, that use
of an alternate fuel would not be feasible at the expiration of the
temporary exemption. However, the ERA has taken the position
that further exemptions after the expiration of a maximum tem-
porary exemption cannot be granted.114 As a result, if contrary to
the ERA's projections, a viable alternate fuel does not materialize
prior to the expiration of the temporary exemption, the facility
might be forced to cease operating until an alternate fuel can be
found.
Applications for an exemption must be supported by a petition
demonstrating that the facts justify the exemptions sought.1 5
The preparation of a petition in support of an exemption can be
complex, time-consuming, and very expensive or relatively simple
and inexpensive depending on the exemption sought.1 6 Engi-
neering consultants expert in the relative availability and charac-
teristics of the various alternate fuels and state-of-the-art air
pollution control technology are essential in preparing these peti-
tions. The client would be well advised to employ consultants
who are already familiar with the process.
117
certain "limited use" and "specific use" exemptions. See 10 C.F.R. § 500.2 (1980); 42
U.S.C. § 8322(c)-(j) (Supp. III 1979).
113. See also text accompanying notes 118-23 infra.
114. See Future Use of Synthetic Fuel, §§ 503.24, 505.14, 44 Fed. Reg. 28964
(1979). This position was explicitly stated to the authors by representatives of the
ERA at several pre-filing conferences and is set forth in the transcripts which are
available from the ERA.
115. 10 C.F.R. § 503.5 (1980).
116. Some exemptions require greater and more expensive evidentiary support
in the petition than others. In general, the limited use and specific use exemp-
tions, such as the fuel mixtures exemption, 10 C.F.R. § 503.38 (1980), are the easiest
to obtain but may not be feasible depending on a particular company's circum-
stances. In contrast, the showing required to establish that envirbnmental quality
regulations cannot be complied with if an alternate fuel is used, 10 C.F.R. § 503.23
(1980), and the engineering and other work necessary to support a cost exemption,
are all time-consuming, and result in substantial cost. For example, to support a
cost exemption, 10 C.F.R. § 503.21 (1980), sufficient design work must be done on a
hypothetical facility for the use of coal or other alternate fuels to generate sup-
portable cost data. This is expensive and obviously takes time. All of this work, of
course, is wholly unproductive for the company.
117. The consultants who participated in the Fuels Decision Report on which
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IV. RISK AND UNCERTAINTY CAUSED BY THE
REGULATORY PROCESS
The permit process for a new or expanded industrial facility.is
fraught with risk and uncertainty. The following discussion is in-
tended to alert the attorney to the various characteristics of the
regulatory process that foster such risk and uncertainty in the
hope that awareness will enable the attorney to avoid some of the
more common and recurring problems.
A. Retroactive Application of New Statutes and Regulations
Much of the uncertainty and risk confronting a company pro-
posing to construct or expand an industrial facility is that new
statutes or regulations adopted during the lengthy permit process
may impose new conditions that were not present when the pro-
posed facility was initially conceived. As discussed below, a pro-
posed industrial facility is probably not immune from the
imposition of new conditions and requirements until all permits
have been obtained and actual construction has commenced.1 18
The potential risks occasioned by the retroactive application of
new requirements to industrial facilities in the advanced planning
stages is effectively illustrated by the recently adopted federal
fuel use act, discussed in the preceding section." 9
As noted above, FUA was enacted on November 9, 1978, but its
prohibition against new MFBI's using natural gas or petroleum
was made retroactive to April 20, 1977, the date the original bill
was introduced.120 A company initiating a major expansion sub-
sequent to April 20, 1977, in an area with serious air pollution
problems would be faced with two equally undesirable options.
The company could install natural gas or petroleum-fired boilers
guessing (or hoping) that FUA would not be enacted or, if en-
acted, would provide an exemption applicable to the facility. On
the other hand, the company could incur the substantial addi-
tional cost and delay in an attempt to obtain permits from state
and federal air pollution control agencies for installation of coal-
fired boilers with state-of-the-art control technology. In certain air
the authors worked were Holmes & Narver, Inc. of Orange, California; KVB, Inc. of
Tustin, California; and Williams Brothers Engineering Company of Tulsa,
Oklahoma. Midwest Research Institute, of Kansas City, Missouri, was consulted
on one aspect of refuse-derived fuel. Holmes & Narver, Inc. headed the engineer-
ing effort and, among other things, set up a computer program for the cost calcula-
tions required. KVB, Inc. was and is involved in state-of-the-art research on coal
combustion.
118. See text accompanying notes 159-62 infra.
119. See text accomanying notes 104-17 supra.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 8312(c) (3) (Supp. 1I 1979).
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basins such as Los Angeles and New York, restrictive air quality
regulations making installation of coal-fired boilers technologi-
cally infeasible.121
The appropriate course of action for the company would depend
on whether the facility were entitled to an environmental or other
exemption under FUA.122 However, FUA did not become effective
until May 8, 1979, and the availability of an exemption could not
be determined until the ERA developed proper procedures to pro-
cess petitions for exemptions. If a company prudently decides to
process a petition for an exemption before construction begins, a
delay of from several months to several years can be expected,
depending upon the exemptions sought. Few companies planning
an industrial expansion can afford to wait an extended period to
have questions concerning the availability of exemptions re-
solved. On the other hand, if the company gambles on the availa-
bility of an exemption and proceeds with construction, it runs the
risk that the facility could not utilize petroleum or natural gas and
substantial modifications would be required before the facility
could commence operations.123
The uncertainty and potential waste inherent in such a situa-
tion is obvious. No matter which option the company selects, it
could potentially lose a staggering sum as a result of risks that do
not advance the ultimate objectives of the regulatory schemes: to
conserve natural gas and petroleum.
Because the enactment of new statutes and the promulgation of
new regulations with retroactive application pose possibly the
greatest risk to the company constructing or expanding an indus-
trial facility, the attorney or company personnel must monitor
federal, state, and municipal legislation and the development of
new regulatory procedures to advise the company at the earliest
possible moment of the possibility that additional, and possibly
more stringent, conditions may be imposed on the proposed facil-
ity. Because the sums invested in land acquisition, planning, and
engineering for a project increase daily during the permit process,
the company must be kept abreast of potential changes and re-
121. Robert MacKnight, Chief Engineer for the South Coast Air Quality Man-
agement District, has advised the authors that no control technology is currently
commercially available that, in his estimation, would permit coal-fired industrial
boilers to be installed in the South Coast Air Basin in California.
122. 42 U.S.C. § 8322(a) (Supp. HII 1979).
123. See text accompanying notes 125-28 infra.
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quirements so that it can make ongoing decisions as to the contin-
ued economic and technical viability of the proposed facility.
B. The Danger of an Interagency Conflict Creating an Impasse
Despite attempts to coordinate better the function of various
governmental agencies, the principal land use, environmental,
and energy-related regulatory programs are administered by sin-
gle purpose agencies.124 There is increasing danger today for a
company constructing a new industrial facility to get caught in
the middle, unable to satisfy the inconsistent requirements of two
or more regulatory programs.
An example of this danger can be derived from the interaction
of FUA and local air quality regulations mandated by the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1977.125 FUA contains an exemption from
the requirement that a new industrial boiler use coal or another
fuel as an alternative to petroleum or natural gas, if applicable
state environmental requirements cannot be met. 26 However,
the burden of proof is placed on the applicant to demonstrate that
the control technology needed to comply with such environmental
requirements will not be available within five years after startup
of the new or expanded facility.127 Vigorously pursuing its objec-
tive to maximize coal conversion, the ERA could well find that the
applicant had not carried its burden of proof and deny the exemp-
tion based on a prediction that developing control technology
would permit coal to be used without violating applicable air qual-
ity regulations within five years.
Notwithstanding the optimism of the ERA about the perform-
ance of developing control technology, the local air pollution con-
trol agency will likely be more skeptical. It is very possible that
such agency will deny a permit for the use of coal based on its
finding that the developing control technology will not permit
such fuel to be used without violating applicable air quality regu-
lations. 28 As a result of the contradictory factual determinations
124. Cunningham & Kremer, Vested Rights, Estoppel and the Land Develop-
ment Process, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 625, 657 (1978). See also Raley v. California Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency, 68 Cal. App. 3d 965, 984, 137 Cal. Rptr. 699, 712 (1977).
125. See text accompanying notes 45-78, 104-17 supra.
126. 42 U.S.C. § 8322(b) (Supp. I 1979); 10 C.F.R. § 503.34 (1980).
127. 10 C.F.R. § 503.34 (1980) provides in relevant part as follows: 'To qualify,
you must demonstrate to the satisfaction of ERA that, despite good faith efforts:
(1) You will be unable within 5 years after beginning operation to comply with the
applicable prohibitions imposed by the Act without violating applicable Federal or
state environmental requirements."
128. For example, the South Coast Air Quality Management District interprets
its rules and regulations as requiring the applicant to demonstrate by actual per-
formance data that the proposed air pollution control technology when installed
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of the two agencies, the facility would have no legally permissible
fuel supply and could not be constructed at all.
The ramifications of such an administrative impasse can be fa-
tal to a new or expanded industrial facility. If the potential for
such impasse is not anticipated, the position of the respective
agencies may be difficult to reverse after formal administrative
decisions have been rendered. Although a judicial remedy to re-
solve such an administrative impasse may be available,129 the
cost in terms of delay may render the remedy of little or no value.
It is important, therefore, in developing an approach to the regula-
tory process, that the potential for an administrative impasse be
identified early and close coordination between the respective
agencies be promoted.
C. Overly Complex or Ambiguous Regulations
Another source of uncertainty results from regulations which
are overly complex, ambiguous, or construed contrary to the plain
meaning of the language used. Although the problems of com-
plexity and ambiguity are all too well understood, an example of
"strained construction" of regulations may be helpful.
The interpretation given by the ARB to a regulation which it
drafted and imposed upon the SCAQMD is illustrative. The regu-
lation in question, the former new source review rule,130 defines
"stationary source" as a "unit or aggregation of units of non-vehic-
ular air contaminant-emitting equipment which is located on one
property or on contiguous properties .... "131 Under the rule,
each new stationary source is limited to a specified increase in
the emissions of regulated air contaminants.132
will achieve the level of control that the manufacturer represents will be achieved.
Telephone conversations between Mr. Prairie and Robert J. MacKnight, Director
of Engineering, South Coast Air Quality Managment District.
129. See text accompanying notes 145-49 infra.
130. South Coast Air Quality Management District Regulations, Rule 213 (su-
perseded by Regulation 13, adopted Oct. 5, 1979).
131. SCAQMD Rule 213.
132. SCAQMD Rule 213 provided in part as follows:
The Air Pollution Control Officer shall deny a permit to construct for any
unit or units constituting a new stationary source if such source will emit
more than 25 pounds per hour or 250 pounds per day of nitrogen oxides,
organic gases, or any air contaminant for which there is a state or national
ambient air quality standard (except carbon monoxide, for which the lim-
its are 250 pounds per hour or 2500 pounds per day), or which is a precur-
sor of any such air contaminant, unless he determines that the emissions
from the new source will not cause a violation of, or will not interfere with
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In calculating the allowable increase in emissions from a pro-
posed expanded facility, the ARB took the position that the exist-
ence of a pipeline connecting two facilities which were fifteen
miles apart, made such facilities "contiguous" and that the pro-
jected emissions from increased non-vehicular traffic at one facil-
ity had to be included in calculating the total increase of
emissions resulting from the expansion.133
Although a court reviewing the ARB's interpretation may well
have found an abuse of discretion, 3 4 the company involved, as is
frequently the case, was not in a position to delay construction of
the expansion project for the period required to seek adjudication
of that issue. As a result, permit conditions that reduced the
financial viability of the project were accepted. These costs were
felt by the company to be less than the loss to be incurred by the
probable delay.
In addition to strained interpretations of regulatory language,
agencies all too often employ regulatory requirements contrary to
their intended purpose. For example, it has been reported that
the threat of a comprehensive review under NEPA or CEQA and
the preparation of an EIS or EIR has been used by certain agen-
cies as leverage to compel the applicant to agree to permit condi-
tions or restrictions that would not and should not have otherwise
been required.135
The best technique for minimizing the potential risks resulting
from the ambiguity and construction of the regulations them-
selves is to work informally with the staff of the applicable agen-
cies from the conception of the project to ascertain how the
regulations will be applied to the project in question. Through
this process, ambiguities or problems in the regulations will be
discovered and the attorney can take an active role, at least at the
the attainment or maintenance of, the state or national ambient air quality
standard for that same contaminant (or, in the case of the precursor, for
the contaminant to which the precursor contributes).
133. Discussions between Mr. Beckman, representing the applicant, and repre-
sentatives of the California Air Resources Board and South Coast Air Quality
Management District.
134. See text accompanying notes 145-49 infra.
135. The level of review under both NEPA and CEQA is largely in the discre-
tion of the administering agency. An agency decision that the project will not
have significant adverse environmental impact often permits the environmental
review process to be completed in a matter of months. In contrast, if the agency
makes the decision that the EIS or EIR is required, the environmental review pro-
cess should last for an indefinite period and involve public hearings which focus
the attention of special interest groups on the project. Notwithstanding agency
guidelines that seek to limit such discretion, the level of review decision remains
highly discretionary and can be used to exact concessions from the applicant that
bear little or no relationship to the purposes of NEPA or CEQA.
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staff level, of resolving ambiguities in a manner consistent with
the company's interest.
D. Agency Vacillations
The great latitude afforded to administrative agencies to impose
new requirements on proposed industrial facilities that have
nearly completed the permit process is illustrated by the case of
Raley v. California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency. 3 6 In that
case Raley, the developer of a shopping center near Lake Tahoe,
attempted to obtain the required permits from the Tahoe Re-
gional Planning Agency ("TRPA"), a bi-state land use agency, and
its state component, the California Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency ("CTRPA"). In 1973 Raley received preliminary approval
for the project from the county, conditioned upon the approval of
the TRPA.137 Raley received the TRPA's conditional approval in
June 1973, which included the consent of the member of the
CTRPA who sat on both boards.138 In reliance on the conditional
TRPA approval, Raley expended $150,000 in planning and engi-
neering for the shopping center.13 9 In April 1974 the CTRPA, reor-
ganized with an increased membership, reconsidered Raley's
proposed development, seeking to impose additional require-
ments, including preparation of an environmental impact report
which would delay or very possibly prohibit the construction of
the project.140
Notwithstanding the court's finding that "Raley spent $150,000
in reliance upon a land use permit lawfully granted by a state in-
strumentality which was then repudiated by a related state in-
strumentality,"141 the court concluded that it could provide him
no relief. 'This case illustrates the risks of relying too confidently
on purported final decisions of an agency.
Even if a comprehensive strategy for approaching the regula-
tory process for a new industrial facility is developed, there is
very little which can be done to anticipate or guard against ad-
ministrative vacillations such as those illustrated by the Raley
case. However, an attorney advising a company proposing to con-
136. 68 Cal. App. 3d 965, 137 Cal. Rptr. 699 (1977).
137. Id. at 972, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 703.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 984, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
140. Id. at 973, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 704.
141. Id. at 984, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
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struct a major new industrial facility should remind the client
that a decision of a regulatory agency cannot necessarily be relied
upon until actual construction was commenced.
E. The Impracticality and Ineffectiveness of Judicial Remedies
In developing a strategy in the permit process, it is important to
appreciate at the outset the great deference shown by California
and federal courts to the decisions of regulatory agencies. Unless
a constitutionally protected right has been infringed upon, chal-
lenges to agency actions denying a permit or imposing restrictive
conditions will generally be limited to those instances in which
the company can demonstrate that the agency abused its discre-
tion or exceeded its statutory authority.142 In addition, although
equitable estoppel has been at least theoretically available to in-
sure that regulatory agencies "honor their commitments," recent
California cases suggest that estoppel may not be invoked against
agencies in permit cases unless the requirements of the "vested
rights" doctrine have been met.143 Moreover, the vested rights
doctrine provides only limited protection against the retroactive
application of new requirements in those instances in which nec-
essary permits have been obtained and substantial construction
has commenced.144 The following discussion attempts to provide a
brief, but realistic, appraisal of the practicality and effectiveness
of judicial review.
1. Judicial Remedies for the Unreasonable Denial of a
Permit or the Imposition of Unwarranted
Conditions
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, it is not uncommon for a
proposed new or expanded facility to be adversely affected by im-
proper administrative action. However, in most cases judicial
remedies are ineffective to correct administrative inequities.
Moreover, judicial remedies are often impractical to the client be-
cause the cost of the delay involved will be greater than the cost
of the administrative action.145
As a practical matter, most challenges to agency actions will be
based on the argument that (i) the action was contrary to the
agency's authorizing statute or implementing regulations or (ii)
the agency abused its discretion in reaching the decision in-
142. See text accompanying notes 146-49 infra.
143. See text accompanying notes 159-62 infra.
144. See text accompanying notes 159-60 infra.
145. See text accompanying notes 130-34 supra.
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volved.146 The chances of success are far greater if the "excess of
authority" challenge can be asserted. As is illustrated by the re-
cent case of Alabama Power Company v. Costle 147, which struck
down certain EPA regulations, it is not uncommon for agencies to
promulgate regulations that are arguably beyond their statutory
mandate.148 Accordingly, an attorney considering a challenge to
an agency action should determine initially whether the action
taken conforms to the agency's regulations and whether the regu-
lations conform to the authorizing statute and legislative history.
The burden of proof makes an abuse of discretion challenge in
either California or federal courts very difficult. Under both Cali-
fornia and federal law the reviewing court will overturn the
agency's decision only if the applicant can show that the agency's
findings were not supported by substantial evidence in the light
of the whole record or were arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lack-
ing in evidentiary support.149 This is a difficult burden to carry.
Thus, it is important to recognize in advising a company con-
structing or expanding an industrial facility that discretionary
agency decisions, even those that appear to be quite arbitrary or
unreasonable, are not likely to be upset by a reviewing court.
Moreover, regulatory agencies, for the most part, are well aware
of the lack of effective judicial recourse available to the company.
Accordingly, the agency is placed in a potentially unconscionable
bargaining position, which is all too often used as leverage to im-
pose conditions that may be so restrictive as to threaten the eco-
146. For a comprehensive discussion of administrative mandamus proceedings
in California, see W. DEERING, CALIFORNIA ADnansTRATIVE MANDAmUs (1967 &
Supp. March 1979). For a discussion of the application of administrative and ordi-
nary mandamus proceedings to zoning, environmental review, and other regula-
tory programs, see J. LONGTIN, supra note 2, at 319-43 (zoning), 403-11 (CEQA),
435-41 (NEPA), 460-62 (water pollution), 533-34 (solid waste), 656-60 (Subdivision
Map Act). For an overview of judicial review of federal agency decisions, see B.
SCVARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 579-644 (1976); E. GELLHOmN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AND PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL 262-73 (1972).
147. 606 F.2d 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
148. See text accompanying note 75 supra.
149. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976 & Supp. I1 1979); CAI. Crv. PRO. CODE §§ 1085,
1094.5 (West 1980). The rationale for the limited scope of review was stated by the
court in Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966): "Congress
was very deliberate in adopting this standard of review. It frees the reviewing
courts of the time-consuming and diffficult task of weighing the evidence, it gives
proper respect to the expertise of the administrative tribunal and it helps promote
the uniform application of the statute."
1013
nomic viability of the project.15o
2. Estoppel Against Regulatory Agencies
The doctrine of equitable estoppel provides that a person may
not deny the existence of a state of facts if he intentionally leads
another to believe particular circumstances to be true and to rely
upon such belief to his detriment.151 Both CaliforniaI 52 and fed-
era1153 courts have held that estoppel may be invoked against a
governmental agency. However, California courts restrict its use
to cases where "in the considered view of a court of equity, the
injustice which would result from a failure to uphold the estoppel
is of sufficient dimension to justify any effect upon public interest
or policy which would result from the raising of an estoppel." 5 4
In contrast, federal courts appear to continue to limit the doctrine
of estoppel to cases where the government is acting in its proprie-
tary rather than sovereign capacity.155
Even California courts, which recognize the doctrine's applica-
tion in land use and permit cases, have more often than not de-
nied its application based on the facts of specific cases. For
example, in Raley v. California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
discussed above,156 the developer was induced to expend $150,000
in planning and architectural expenses for a shopping center
based on the express approval of a bi-state planning agency and
the tacit approval of its California counterpart, which had overlap-
ping membership with the bi-state agency. 57 A trial court deci-
150. For example, the Economic Regulatory Agency of the Department of En-
ergy at one point in time took the position that all permanent exemptions under
the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 would require an EIS to com-
ply with NEPA. It is doubtful that Congress intended NEPA to apply to those per-
manent exemptions that are mandatory and must be granted if the required
factual showing is made by the applicant. Since no discretionary decision is in-
volved, the preparation of an EIS serves no useful purpose because the agency
has no discretion to take any other action. However, the potential for delay result-
ing from the EIS requirement tends to coerce applicants to seek temporary ex-
emptions in order to avoid the requirement even though, under the statute, they
are entitled to a permanent exemption.
151. City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 488, 476 P.2d 423, 442, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 23, 42 (1970).
152. See, e.g., Strong v. County of Santa Cruz, 15 Cal. 3d 720, 523 P.2d 264, 125
Cal. Rptr. 896 (1975); City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 476 P.2d 423, 91
Cal. Rptr. 23 (1970). See also Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 124, at 648-60.
153. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743, 748 (9th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 481 F.2d 985, 988 (9th Cir. 1973).
154. City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 496-97, 476 P.2d 423, 448, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 23, 48 (1970).
155. See, e.g., Air-Sea Brokers, Inc. v. United States, 596 F.2d 1008, 1011
(C.C.P.A. 1979); United States v. Georgia-Pacific Co., 421 F.2d 92, 101 (9th Cir. 1970).
156. See text accompanying notes 136-41 supra.
157. 68 Cal. App. 3d 965, 972, 137 Cal. Rptr. 699, 703 (1977).
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sion estopping the California agency from imposing additional
requirements was reversed by the court of appeal which held that
the trial court did not properly consider whether the injustice to
the developer was of "sufficient dimension" to justify his insula-
tion from the public interest in environmental regulation. 5 8
In addition to the reluctance of courts to invoke the doctrine,
the availability of equitable estoppel against agencies has been
eroded by recent cases holding that estoppel may not be invoked
in permit cases absent the perfection of a vested right.159 Be-
cause important investment decisions are often based on the rep-
resentations and assurances of agency officials, the erosion of the
estoppel doctrine in land use and permit cases is of great signifi-
cance. In advising the company seeking to construct or expand
an industrial facility, the attorney must, therefore, keep the com-
pany's management on guard by reminding it that the promises
and assurances of agency officials are, as a practical matter, unen-
forceable until a vested right has been perfected.
3. Implications of the Vested Rights Doctrine
It has long been the rule in California and in other states that if
a property owner has performed substantial work and incurred
substantial liabilities in good faith reliance upon a permit issued
by the government, he acquires a vested right to complete con-
struction in accordance with the terms of the permit.160 Once a
company has secured a vested right, the government may not, by
virtue of a change in the laws or regulations, prohibit construction
158. Id. at 979-83, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 707-11.
159. See, e.g., Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Com-
mission, 17 Cal. 3d 785, 799-800, 553 P.2d 546, 555-56, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386, 395-96 (1976);
Furey v. City of Sacramento, 146 Cal. Rptr. 485, 491 (1978) rev'd on other grounds,
24 Cal. 3d 862, 598 P.2d 844, 157 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1979). In Furey, the court stated as
follows:
Under Avco, only estoppels which rise to the level of "vested rights" can
be judicially recognized in zoning and permit cases. Although ...
"[s]everal decisions intimate that a building permit may no longer be the
sine qua non of a vested right if preliminary public permits are suffi-
ciently definitive and manifest all final discretionary approvals required
for completion of specific buildings" . . . plaintiffs here obtained no per-
mits or approvals whatsoever. Their claim based upon the sewer assess-
ments and prior general planning documents is substantially short of the
required showing.
81 Cal. App. 3d 483, 146 Cal. Rptr. 485, 490-91 (1978) (citation omitted).
160. Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 17
Cal. 3d 785, 791, 553 P.2d 546, 554-55, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386, 389-90 (1976). See also Cun-
ningham & Kremer, supra note 124, at 676-708.
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authorized by the permit upon which the company has relied.161
Therefore, notwithstanding the substantial amounts of capital
which must be invested in land acquisition, design, and engineer-
ing prior to completing the permit process, California and federal
law affords little or no protection to such investments. Thus, until
a "vested right" is perfected by obtaining the necessary permits
and commencing actual construction, the project can be delayed,
rendered economically infeasible, or even prohibited by the appli-
cation of new laws or regulations or by a regulatory agency
merely changing its mind.162 In condemning the risks and uncer-
tainties often imposed on companies by the rigid application of
the vested rights doctrine, a recent California court noted that the
rule "gives a green light to administrative vacillations virtually up
to the moment the builder starts pouring concrete."163
The multiplicity of environmental and energy-related permits
often required for industrial facilities presents difficult problems
with respect to the vesting of the company's rights. If the com-
pany prudently decides to avoid substantial construction until all
major discretionary permits have been obtained, the vesting of its
rights as to any particular permit would not occur until the last
permit had been obtained and substantial construction had com-
menced. On the other hand, if the company proceeds with con-
struction in order to vest a land use permit, the project may
subsequently be disapproved by the AQMD or other agency, and
the amount invested in construction might be lost. Because of the
protracted period which may be necessary to obtain all required
permits and approvals, a major new industrial facility can be
mired seemingly forever in the regulatory process by the chang-
ing requirements imposed on the project.
The late vesting problem facing new industrial facilities can
possibly be mitigated by the development of a strategy for the
"sequential" vesting of the various major permits as they are ob-
tained. Thus, for example, the award of a permit to construct by
an AQMD could possibly be vested by execution of a binding con-
tract for purchase of the boilers or other equipment, and con-
struction of the foundations to install such equipment at the
site.164 The vesting issue should be considered independently as
161. Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 17
Cal. 3d 785, 791, 553 P.2d 546, 554-555, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386, 389-90 (1976).
162. See text accompanying notes 136-42 supra.
163. Raley v. California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 68 Cal. App. 3d 965,
985, 137 Cal. Rptr. 699, 711-12 (1977).
164. No California court has faced the specific issue of what constitutes "sub-
stantial construction" for a permit to install air pollution-emitting equipment is-
sued by an air quality management district or air pollution control district. A
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to each permit and, based on the likelihood that retroactive re-
quirements will be imposed, the company can make a case-by-
case decision as to whether the capital investment necessary to
acquire a vested right as to a particular permit should be made.
V. DEVELOPING A STRATEGY FOR THE PERMrr PROCESS
Although the list of various regulatory programs, and the
problems they create is formidable, industrial development in
California can still be accomplished. The approach suggested by
this article can greatly increase the chances of success, and mini-
mize the delays caused by the proliferation of regulatory pro-
grams. This approach involves the careful preparation of an
overall strategy to the permit process at the inception of the pro-
ject by an interdisciplinary team of management, engineers, and
attorneys. It is based on the assumption that new industrial facil-
ities must be located, designed, and constructed with the regula-
tory requirements foremost in mind.
The role of the attorney in the interdisciplinary approach will,
by necessity, vary with each project. In general, however, the at-
torney's role will include the following:
(i) After preliminary information about the project is obtained
from the company, the attorney should compile a compendium of
those regulatory programs that could be applicable to the new or
expanded industrial facility. The digest at the beginning of this
article could prove helpful in preparing the compendium. In most
instances, it will be helpful to forward a copy of the compendium
to the company, together with a request specifying in detail the
information that will be required to determine the regulatory re-
quirements that will be applicable to the facility.
(ii) The attorney should next obtain more detailed informa-
tion regarding the project, including projections of the emissions
of air and water contaminants; the quantity and type of solid
waste and effluent which will be generated; the anticipated re-
quirements for electricity, water, and other municipal services;
and the requirements for access to freeways, highways, or rail-
road spur tracks. In addition, because the regulatory programs
may preclude construction of the facility with the exact produc-
compelling argument could be made that execution of a binding contract for the
acquisition of the equipment would be sufficient to give the applicant a "vested
right."
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tion capacity desired by the company, it should be determined
whether the projected emissions of air or water contaminants
would be significantly affected by a marginal reduction in the
designed capacity of the proposed facility. This information will
be obtained from the company and its design engineers. The dis-
cussion in this article of the major regulatory programs that are
likely to impose the most serious constraints on industrial devel-
opment in California should prove helpful in determining which
information will be required. After the above information is ob-
tained, the attorney should analyze in detail the regulatory re-
quirements and provide the company with a detailed analysis of
the regulatory requirements that will pose the most significant
problems for the proposed facility.
(iii) The attorney should next work with the company's design
engineers, commercial real estate broker, marketing department,
and other affected company officials to ascertain all potential sites
for the proposed facility. At the outset, the attorney should ad-
vise company officials that the ability to satisfy the myriad of reg-
ulatory requirements may depend on flexibility in the selection of
a site and that the attorney's involvement in the site selection
process is crucial. For each proposed site, the company's team
should conduct an air quality analysis and determine whether the
proposed facility could be constructed in conformance with the
applicable air quality regulations at that location.165 As discussed
in the article, site selection will also be affected by the availability
of municipal services, access to transportation facilities, and the
ability of the municipal sewage system to accommodate effluent
from the proposed facility.166
(iv) Once the site is selected, the attorney and company of-
ficers should personally contact and inform the local political rep-
resentatives of the project. These individuals should be supplied
with all available information on the benefits of the project, such
as jobs created and tax revenues to be received by the municipal-
ity, so that they will be in a position to promote the project and
provide assistance in obtaining local permits and approvals.
(v) Personal contact should also be made with the appropriate
personnel in all the municipal departments or public utilities that
will be supplying utilities or services to the project, to establish
good working relationships. Similar contact and working relations
should be established at the various regulatory agencies from
whom permits, licenses, or exemptions will be required. In ma-
165. See text accompanying notes 77-78 supra.
166. See Digest, supra note 2, items 15-16. See also text accompanying notes 92-
95 supra.
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ture agencies, the working staff is frequently very experienced
and wields considerable influence on the agency's decision. In
such instances, it may be counter-productive to involve higher
levels in the agency. In contrast, applications processed by agen-
cies administering new programs for which regulatory procedures
have not become well-established may become mired at the staff
level, and it may be necessary to seek the intervention of higher
levels in the agency to obtain a timely decision.
(vi) The possibility of political intervention should neither be
overlooked nor overrated. At the federal level, a senator or repre-
sentative may be able to expedite the processing of an application
that otherwise might become stalled. However, political interven-
tion has been much less successful in substantively affecting an
agency's decision.
(vii) Attention should be given to the degree to which reliance
can be placed on the apparent approvals received. Consideration
should be given to the sequential vesting suggestions made in the
section of this article dealing with judicial remedies.167
While these suggestions may appear simple, implementing
them requires much thought and care. A company setting out to
install a major increase in capacity in California, and virtually
everywhere else, will not be in for an easy ride. Comprehensive
early planning by a skilled team can, however, smooth the way to
the fullest extent possible.
167. See text accompanying notes 159-62 supra.
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